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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SADEK RAOUF EBEID, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
FACEBOOK, INC, 
Defendant. 
 
 
Case No.  18-cv-07030-PJH    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Re: Dkt. No. 11 
 
 Defendant Facebook, Inc’s (“Facebook”) motion to dismiss came on for hearing 
before this court on May 1, 2019.  Plaintiff Sadek Raouf Ebeid appeared through his 
counsel, Behzad Vahidi.  Facebook appeared through its counsel, Paven Malhotra and 
Victor Yu.  Having read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their 
arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby 
GRANTS defendant’s motion, for the following reasons.  
BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff was born and raised in Cairo, Egypt, but is now a resident of Arizona.  
Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶ 10.  Ebeid alleges he has long been involved in the political and national 
issues of Egypt.  Id. ¶ 11.  As part of that involvement, in August 2010, Ebeid created a 
public Facebook page, titled “Egypt-Cradle of Love” (the “ECL page”).  Id. ¶ 13.  The 
purpose of that page “was to promote religious tolerance and the mutual acceptance of 
people of all faiths in Egypt and the Middle east.”  Id.  Many of Ebeid’s posts on the ECL 
public page were in Arabic.  Id. ¶ 14.   
The parties do not dispute that Facebook gives users the ability to “boost” their 
posts.  Id.  The boost feature allows users to turn posts that are otherwise free to publish 
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into advertisements that target specific demographics.  Id.  If a user decides to boost his 
posts, Facebook charges the user for each time the boosted post is actually displayed to 
other users.  Before the events that form the basis of this action, plaintiff regularly used 
Facebook’s boost feature to promote posts on the ECL page.  Id.  
In early 2017, Ebeid started an advertisement campaign on the ECL page calling 
for the recall of John Casson, the then-British Ambassador to Egypt.  Compl. ¶ 16.  As 
that campaign gained popularity, Ebied allegedly experienced repeated restrictions and 
interference by Facebook related to his ability to promote his campaign.  Id. ¶ 17.  
According to plaintiff, all of Facebook’s conduct “shared a common goal and outcome, 
which was prohibiting Dr. Ebeid from utilizing Facebook’s public forum to exercise his 
right to free speech in supporting the Campaign[.]”  Id. ¶ 17. 
 Between March 2017 and August 2017, plaintiff and other administrators of the 
ECL page published and boosted numerous posts in support of ECL’s campaign 
advocating for the recall of Casson.  Id. ¶¶ 18-21.  Facebook allegedly responded to that 
campaign by removing some of those posts and restricting or suspending plaintiff’s and 
the other administrators’ access to the Facebook platform or certain of its features.  Id.  In 
August 2017, Facebook suspended Ebeid’s personal Facebook page for 30 days.  Id. 
 In response to the restrictions imposed by Facebook, in September 2017, two 
people created a Facebook group called “Friends of Dr. Sadek Raouf Ebeid” (the 
“Friends of Ebeid page”).  Id. ¶ 22.  Over the next several months, Ebeid and others 
shared posts from the ECL page on their own personal Facebook pages and on the 
Friends of Ebeid page.  Id. ¶ 23.  In December 2017, Facebook notified Ebeid that 
sharing posts from the ECL page would result in Facebook restricting Ebeid’s use of the 
Facebook platform.  Id. ¶ 24.  Between September 2017 and February 2018, Facebook 
restricted Ebeid from posting or joining any Facebook group—including the Friends of 
Ebeid group—approximately 16 times.  Id. ¶ 28.  Though Facebook removed the 
restriction each time Ebeid appealed the decision to restrict his access, Facebook 
nevertheless restricted plaintiff’s access again, sometimes as early as the next day.  Id.   
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During the same time period, Facebook allegedly removed numerous posts made 
by plaintiff on the Friends of Ebeid page and the ECL page.  Compl. ¶¶ 29-33.  On at 
least five occasions, Facebook removed the posts after labeling them as “spam.”  Id.  
Though Facebook reversed its decision after Ebeid challenged Facebook’s removal of 
the posts, Facebook subsequently continued to remove similar posts as “spam.”  Id. ¶ 33.  
According to the complaint, Facebook removed Ebeid’s posts and restricted “his access 
solely to interfere with his ability to campaign for the recall of the British Ambassador.”  Id. 
¶ 34.  
Lastly, plaintiff alleges that throughout the months of April and May 2018, 
Facebook told plaintiff that his posts were being boosted as requested, when in fact that 
was not the case.  Id. ¶¶ 35-38.  Plaintiff’s sole support for this allegation is that plaintiff’s 
past boosted posts had reached about 100,000 Facebook users, while Ebeid’s April and 
May posts, which were similar in content and targeted demographic to the past posts, 
reached only a nominal number of users.  Id. ¶¶ 35-37.  Plaintiff complains that those 
disparate results can only be attributed Facebook’s failure to boost the posts, despite its 
representations to the contrary.  Id. ¶ 38.  Importantly, plaintiff does not contend that he 
was charged for posts that were not actually boosted or seen by other Facebook users.  
Instead, plaintiff alleges that he was somehow harmed by Facebook’s interference with 
his ability to use the page to promote his “ideas and message.”  Id. ¶ 39.  
 Based on those allegations, plaintiff alleges seven causes of action for: (i) violation 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq. (“Title II”); (ii) violation of the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (iii) violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights 
Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq. (the “UCRA” or “Unruh Act”); (iv) fraud and/or 
intentional misrepresentation; (v) breach of contract; (vi) breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing; and (vii) violation of California’s Unlawful Business 
Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”).  
 Defendant now moves to dismiss.  
DISCUSSION 
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A. Legal Standard 
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims 
alleged in the complaint.  Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003).  
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint include a “short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(2), a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a 
cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 
theory.  Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). 
While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, 
legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be 
accepted.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).  The complaint must proffer 
sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558–59 (2007). 
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it 
has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ”  Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(2)).  Where dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is 
clear the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment.  Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 
1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 The court’s review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint, although 
the court can also consider documents “whose contents are alleged in a complaint and 
whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the 
plaintiff's pleading.”  Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 
Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007).  The court may also consider 
matters that are properly the subject of judicial notice, Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 
688–89 (9th Cir. 2001), exhibits attached to the complaint, Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 
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Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989), and documents 
referenced extensively in the complaint and documents that form the basis of the 
plaintiff's claims, No. 84 Emp'r-Teamster Jt. Counsel Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding 
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 925 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 
For plaintiff's claims that sound in fraud, the complaint must also meet the 
heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  See Kearns v. 
Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009).  Rule 9(b) requires a party alleging 
fraud or mistake to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. 
“To satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement, the complaint must include an account of 
the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities 
of the parties to the misrepresentations.”  Depot, Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc., 915 
F.3d 643, 668 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
B. Analysis 
1. The Communications Decency Act Immunizes Facebook From 
Liability For Counts I-III and In Part For Count VII 
 Defendant first argues that § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”) 
immunizes it from plaintiff’s Title II claim, First Amendment claim, UCRA claim, and part 
of the UCL claim (together, the “content-based-restriction claims”).  According to 
defendant, it is immune from those claims because they essentially seek to hold 
Facebook liable for restricting what plaintiff can post on the Facebook platform.  The 
court agrees.  
“Section 230 immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability 
arising from content created by third parties.”  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley 
v. Roommates.Com, LLC (“Roommates”), 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc)).  Under § 230(c)(1), “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Accordingly, the CDA bars plaintiff’s content-
based-restriction claims if “(1) [the] Defendant is a ‘provider or user of an interactive 
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computer service;’ (2) the information for which Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable is 
‘information provided by another information content provider;’ and (3) Plaintiff's claim 
seeks to hold Defendant liable as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of that information.”  Sikhs for 
Justice "SFJ", Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092-93 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(quoting § 230), aff'd sub nom. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 F. App'x 526 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
a. Interactive Computer Service 
 Consistent with numerous prior decisions, plaintiff does not dispute that defendant 
qualifies as an “interactive computer service.”  See e.g., Id.; Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 
F. Supp. 2d 785, 801–02 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  This court agrees.  
b. Information Provided by Another Information Content Provider 
 Plaintiff argues that the information at issue was not provided by another 
information content provider because plaintiff himself—not some other third-party—
provided the information.  That argument has been repeatedly rejected.  
 
[T]he CDA precludes publisher liability against an interactive 
computer service for content created by “another information 
content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  An “information 
content provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”  Id. § 230(f)(3).  “The reference 
to ‘another information content provider'. . . distinguishes the 
circumstance in which the interactive computer service itself 
meets the definition of ‘information content provider’ with 
respect to the information in question.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 
F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Perkins, 53 F. Supp. 
3d at 1246 (noting that § 230's “grant of immunity only applies 
if the interactive computer service provider is not also an 
‘information content provider’ ” (quoting Roommates, 521 F.3d 
at 1162)).  In other words, the CDA immunizes an interactive 
computer service provider that “passively displays content that 
is created entirely by third parties,” but not an interactive 
computer service provider that acts as an information content 
provider by creating or developing the content at issue.  
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162.  Put another way, “third-party 
content” is used to refer to content created entirely by 
individuals or entities other than the interactive computer 
service provider.  See id. 
SFJ, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1093–94. 
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 Essentially, plaintiff reads “third-party” into a statute that only requires “another” 
party, which plaintiff certainly qualifies as.  See also Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., No. 15-
CV-05299-HSG, 2016 WL 3648608, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016) (holding that plaintiff’s 
own content satisfied second prong of the CDA immunity test).  
c. Treatment As A Publisher 
 Defendant contends that plaintiff’s content-based-restriction claims stem from 
defendant’s decision to remove plaintiff’s posts or restrict plaintiff’s ability to publish new 
posts.  According to defendant, such acts are traditional publisher functions protected by 
the CDA.  Plaintiff argues that the content-based-restriction claims allege discrimination 
and, therefore, do not seek to hold defendant liable as the publisher or speaker of the 
information at issue.  The court again agrees with defendant. 
 In determining whether the CDA immunizes a defendant from liability, the court 
must look to “whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the 
defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another,” “not the name of 
the cause of action.”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009), as 
amended (Sept. 28, 2009).  “[C]ourts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges 
the defendant violated derives from the defendant's status or conduct as a ‘publisher or 
speaker.’  If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”  Id. at 1102. 
“[P]ublication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to 
withdraw from publication third-party content.”  Id.  Thus, “a publisher . . . decides 
whether to publish” “material submitted for publication.”  Id.  It is “immaterial whether this 
decision comes in the form of deciding what to publish in the first place or what to remove 
among the published material.”  Id. at 1102 n. 8.  “[A]ny activity that can be boiled down 
to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce 
immune under section 230.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170–71. 
Here, defendant’s decision to remove plaintiff’s posts undoubtedly falls under 
“publisher” conduct.  See SFJ, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1095; Lancaster, 2016 WL 3648608, at 
*3 (“CDA precludes as a matter of law any claim arising from defendants’ removal of 
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plaintiff’s videos”).  The same is true for Facebook’s on-and-off again restriction of 
plaintiff’s use of and ability to post on the Facebook platform.  That conduct can be 
“boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post 
online.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170–71; Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., 444 F. App’x 986, 
987 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Section 230(c)(1) immunizes “decisions to delete [plaintiff’s] user 
profiles.”); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that 
Twitter’s decision to allow ISIS to have accounts qualified as publisher activity under § 
230); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (similar). 
 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has rejected plaintiff’s argument that CDA immunity does 
not apply to Title II claims.  Sikhs for Justice, Inc., 697 F. App'x at 526 (“[W]e have found 
no authority, and SFJ fails to cite any authority, holding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 provides an exception to the immunity afforded to Facebook under the CDA.”); 
see also SFJ, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1095 (holding CDA immunized defendant from Title II 
liability despite allegation that defendant engaged in “blatant discriminatory conduct”; 
affirmed by Sikhs for Justice, 697 F. App’x at 526).  This court sees no reason why 
plaintiff’s UCRA claim and plaintiff’s UCL claim, to the extent it is based on discrimination, 
should be treated differently.  See Riggs, 444 F. App’x at 987 (CDA immunizes defendant 
from state causes of action); see Nat'l Ass'n of the Deaf v. Harvard Univ., No. 3:15-CV-
30023-KAR, 2019 WL 1409302, at *10 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2019) (“Federal and state 
antidiscrimination statutes are not exempted” from the CDA. (citing § 230(e)).).  
d. CDA Conclusion  
Accordingly, because CDA immunity applies, the court DISMISSES causes of 
action I-III WITH PREJUDICE.  In addition, plaintiff’s UCL claim is DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE to the extent it relies on allegations that defendant removed plaintiff’s posts 
or restricted his ability to use the Facebook platform.   
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not State A Claim 
a. Plaintiff Has Failed To State A Title II Claim 
Section 2000a(a) of Title II states: “All persons shall be entitled to the full and 
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equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, 
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national 
origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).   
Plaintiff has failed to state a Title II claim for multiple reasons.  First, plaintiff has 
not adequately alleged that Facebook’s conduct was based on plaintiff’s “race, color, 
religion, or national origin.”  While the complaint alleges plaintiff’s national origin, Compl. 
¶ 10, other than a conclusory allegation that mirrors the language of § 2000a(a), the FAC 
does nothing to connect that national origin to Facebook’s alleged conduct.  The same 
goes for allegations about plaintiff’s use of Arabic on the Facebook platform.  Indeed, the 
complaint’s allegations suggest that, if anything, Facebook denied plaintiff access to its 
services based on plaintiff’s views about the then-British Ambassador to Egypt.  See 
Compl. ¶ 34 (“Facebook was removing [Ebeid’s] posts and restricting his access solely to 
interfere with his ability to campaign for the recall of the British Ambassador.”); see also 
id. ¶ 17.  
Second, Facebook is not a public accommodation covered by Title II.  The Ninth 
Circuit has held that Title II “covers only places, lodgings, facilities and establishments.”  
Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
national organization was not sufficiently connected to a “place” open to the public).  
Section 2000a(b)’s catchall provision, subsection (b)(4), “emphasizes the importance of 
physical presence by referring to any ‘establishment . . . which is physically located 
within’ an establishment otherwise covered, or ‘within . . . which’ an otherwise covered 
establishment ‘is physically located.’”  Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 
532, 541 (E.D. Va. 2003) (quoting § 2000a(b)(4); emphasis and ellipses in original), aff'd 
sub nom. Noah v. AOL-Time Warner, Inc., No. 03-1770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 
24, 2004) (finding chat rooms are not “public accommodations”).  Though plaintiff points 
to the physical location of Facebook’s servers, plaintiff’s use of and the service provided 
by Facebook’s online platform “is unconnected to entry into a public place or facility” and 
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therefore “the plain language of Title II makes the statute inapplicable.”  Clegg, 18 F.3d at 
756 (offering goods or services is insufficient without evidence that the “goods or services 
are sold, purchased, performed or engaged in from any public facility or establishment”). 
For each of those reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a Title II claim.  
b. Plaintiff Has Failed To State A First Amendment Claim 
 Plaintiff argues that Facebook has violated his First Amendment rights by 
regulating his speech in a public forum.  Though plaintiff concedes that Facebook is a 
private entity, he nevertheless argues that Facebook can be held liable under the public 
function test, which, when satisfied, treats private entities as state actors. 
 Under the public function test, “[p]rivate activity becomes a ‘public function’ only if 
that action has been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’ ”  Brunette v. 
Humane Soc'y of Ventura Cty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)).  The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hile 
many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 
exclusively reserved to the State.”  Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Examples of functions that have been deemed to be 
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State” include “hold[ing] [public] elections,” 
“govern[ing] a town,” and “serv[ing] as an international peacekeeping force.”  Brunette, 
294 F.3d at 1214.  It is this “exclusivity” that plaintiff fails to show applies to Facebook’s 
regulation of speech on its platform.  See Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-
LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (collecting cases that have 
declined to treat private social media corporations as state actors for regulating content 
on their websites).   
 Because Facebook is a private entity and because plaintiff has failed to show that 
Facebook should be treated as a state actor, plaintiff has failed to state a First 
Amendment claim.  Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal 
or state.”).   
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c. Plaintiff Has Failed To State A UCRA Claim 
 The UCRA provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free 
and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, . . 
. [or] primary language . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 
whatsoever.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).  “The California Supreme Court has clarified that 
the Unruh Act contemplates willful, affirmative misconduct on the part of those who 
violate the Act[.]”  Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News 
Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 425 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Plaintiff must prove “intentional discrimination” in violation of the terms of the Act.  Id.  
 Plaintiff has failed to state a UCRA claim for at least two reasons.  First, as 
discussed above, plaintiff has not adequately alleged that Facebook’s conduct was 
animated by discriminatory intent.  And plaintiff’s contention that Facebook’s actions were 
“arbitrary” undermines, rather than supports, his UCRA claim—no inference of 
discrimination arises from assertions of arbitrariness.  Second, application of the Unruh 
Act is limited to “persons within the jurisdiction of” California who have suffered harm 
therein.  Tat Tohumculuk, A.S. v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. CIV 13-0773 WBS KJN, 2013 WL 
6070483, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (rejecting argument that the UCRA applied 
because discrimination was approved by defendants’ officers within California); Warner v. 
Tinder Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (same; collecting cases).  
Plaintiff is a resident of Arizona, Compl. ¶ 8, but has not even asserted that the alleged 
discrimination took place while he was in California. 
For each of those reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a UCRA claim. 
d. Plaintiff Has Failed to State A Claim for Breach of Contract Or 
Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation 
 Plaintiff’s breach of contract and fraud claims are premised on Facebook’s alleged 
“fail[ure] to boost Dr. Ebeid’s posts despite [Facebook] notifying Dr. Ebeid that the posts 
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have in fact been boosted.”  Compl. ¶ 67; id. ¶¶ 58-62.1 
 To plead a claim for breach of contract under California law, a plaintiff must allege: 
“(1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; 
(3) defendant's breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.”  Appling v. 
Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 745 F. Supp. 2d 961, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting CDF 
Firefighters v. Maldonado, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1239 (2008)).  To plead a fraud claim 
under California law, a plaintiff must allege “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, 
concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to 
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.”  
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 974 (1997), as modified (July 30, 
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Manderville v. PCG&S Grp., Inc., 146 
Cal. App. 4th 1486, 1498 (2007) (enumerating similar elements for the tort of intentional 
misrepresentation).   
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under either theory.  First, plaintiff’s contract 
claim fails because “[i]n an action for breach of a written contract, a plaintiff must allege 
the specific provisions in the contract creating the obligation the defendant is said to have 
breached.”  Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  The 
complaint does not allege which contract Facebook allegedly breached, much less the 
breach of a specific provision therein.  
 Second, plaintiff does not allege that Facebook failed to perform its obligations 
under the contract.  Assuming the complaint attempts to allege a breach of Facebook’s 
Self-Serve Ad Terms (the “SSAT”), the SSAT specifically reserved Facebook’s right to 
“reject or remove any ad for any reason” and states that Facebook does “not guarantee 
                                            
1 Plaintiff’s opposition asserts two new theories of liability that were not alleged in the 
complaint.  Those allegations, even if assumed sufficient, cannot provide a basis for 
defeating defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 
(9th Cir. 2003) (“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not 
look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers[.]” (emphasis in original)).  
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the activity that [ ] ads will receive[.]”  Dkt. 11-5, Ex. D ¶¶ 7, 13; Dkt. 11-6, Ex. E ¶¶ 3, 8.2  
For similar reasons, plaintiff has not adequately alleged a misrepresentation supporting 
his fraud claim.  Depot, 915 F.3d at 668 (Rule 9(b) requires the complaint to “include an 
account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations[.]” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 Third, plaintiff’s breach of contract and fraud claims fail because plaintiff has not 
alleged damages that occurred as a result of the breach or alleged misrepresentation.  
As noted above, plaintiff does not allege that he was charged for ads that were not 
boosted.  Further, at the hearing on this motion, plaintiff’s counsel was unable to 
articulate an alternative basis for harm tied to Facebook’s alleged failure to adequately 
boost plaintiff’s posts.  As to the fraud claim, plaintiff’s allegations of harm fall far short of 
the particularity required by Rule 9(b).  See Compl. ¶¶ 39, 62 (conclusorily alleging 
harm); Shahangian v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, No. CV15-1919 DMG (MRWX), 2015 WL 
12696038, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015) (“[A] plaintiff must plead facts suggesting that 
the damages in question were the direct result of the misrepresentation in question.”).   
 For each of the above reasons, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s fraud and breach 
of contract claims.   
e. Plaintiff Has Failed To State a Claim for Breach of Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim 
 Under California law, “[t]here is implied in every contract a covenant by each party 
not to do anything which will deprive the other parties thereto of the benefits of the 
contract.”  Harm v. Frasher, 181 Cal. App. 2d 405, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).  To state a 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, a plaintiff must show “that the 
conduct of the defendant, whether or not it also constitutes a breach of a consensual 
contract term, demonstrates a failure or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, 
                                            
2 Plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of or Facebook’s reliance upon the SSAT 
documents. 
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prompted . . . by a conscious and deliberate act.”  Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific 
Business Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).  Further, “a party 
cannot be held liable on a bad faith claim for doing what is expressly permitted in the 
agreement.”  Solomon v. N. Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 Here, plaintiff’s claim fails because it is premised on the allegation that Facebook 
“did not boost [plaintiff’s] posts,” Compl. ¶ 72—conduct that the contract expressly 
permits.   
Plaintiff’s papers alternatively contend that “Facebook’s discriminatory actions”—
removing posts and restricting plaintiff’s use of the Facebook platform—“have interfered 
with [plaintiff’s] ability to grow and promote the ECL page and his campaign, and thus 
[Facebook] has failed to exercise” its contractual right to remove or disapprove any post 
in good faith.  That theory fails to support plaintiff’s breach of implied covenant claim for 
two reasons.  First, as discussed above, plaintiff has not adequately alleged that 
Facebook’s actions were discriminatory.  Second, as with the theory actually alleged in 
the complaint, plaintiff has conceded that Facebook had the contractual right to remove 
or disapprove any post or ad at Facebook’s sole discretion.   
For those reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a breach of implied covenant of good 
faith claim.  
f. Plaintiff Has Not Stated a UCL Claim 
 Plaintiff’s UCL claim relies solely upon the UCL’s “unlawful” prong.  Compl. ¶ 77. 
Because plaintiff has failed to state a predicate violation, plaintiff’s UCL claim also must 
be dismissed.  See Krantz v. BT Visual Images, LLC, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 178 (2001). 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion.  Plaintiff’s first, 
second, and third causes of action are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and, 
additionally, because the CDA immunizes defendant from liability, those causes of action 
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  Plaintiff’s fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action 
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are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.  However, if plaintiff 
chooses to amend any of those three claims, plaintiff’s amended complaint shall include 
specific allegations about the relevant contractual provision and the alleged 
misrepresentations.  In addition, any amended complaint shall allege a specific harm not 
dependent on defendant’s alleged failure to adequately boost plaintiff’s posts.  Plaintiff’s 
seventh cause of action for unfair competition under § 17200 is DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE to the extent it relies on causes of action one through three and to the 
extent it relies on defendant’s alleged failure to adequately boost plaintiff’s posts.  In all 
other respects, it is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.   
 Plaintiff’s amended complaint, if any, shall be filed no later than May 31, 2019.  No 
new parties or claims may be added without defendant’s consent or leave of court.  
 Because this is plaintiff’s first complaint and because the court is giving plaintiff 
leave to amend in part, defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion is DENIED without prejudice.  
Verizon Delawarem Inc. v. Covad Communications. Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“[G]ranting a defendant’s anti–SLAPP motion to strike a plaintiff’s initial complaint 
without granting the plaintiff leave to amend would directly collide with Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a)’s policy favoring liberal amendment.”).   
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: May 9, 2019 
  
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 
United States District Judge 
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